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resident Bush's response to September 11 — he has
called this "war on terrorism" a "crusade" — is terrifying 
in its own right, framing the future as a reprise of the 
medieval past: several centuries of battle between Christianity 
and Islam. It's "going to take a while," Bush said. The White 
House may have subsequently backed off that rhetoric, but 
the metaphor (if it is one) draws on entrenched habits of 
thought. It reminds me of the rhetoric of an earlier description 
of Afghanistan as itself stuck in the Middle Ages: Diane Sawyer 
did a "20/20" program in the fall of 1996 called "Behind the 
Veil — A Report on the Woman [sic] of Afghanistan," in which 
the women were described as having been returned "to the 
middle ages." Sawyer in fact characterized her travel to 
Afghanistan as time travel: their plane "is going to take us 
about an hour and a half back into the mountains, and . . . 
that's several hundred years in time." Lately, in the last three 
weeks, if conditions in Afghanistan haven't been described as 
medieval, they're labeled downright "primitive," as is bin 
Laden's network.
As a medievalist by training, I know the subtlety and 
compassion to be found in the works of Chaucer. So how is it 
that "medieval" comes to play such a part in a warmongering 
vocabulary? (I increasingly feel the need for a Concerned 
Medievalists for Peace group.)
Granted, there was no shortage of violence in the 
Western Middle Ages: the 100 Years' War lasted for more than 
100 years. But calling a culture "medieval" does something 
more than simply associate it with historical violence. It's one 
way of rejecting and dissociating ourselves from practices that 
we find abhorrent: The medieval is opposed to the modern. 
But also — and somewhat paradoxically — the medieval is 
what we once were and have moved beyond. Calling a culture 
"medieval" asserts our Western time-line of progress, 
understanding the whole world in terms of Western progress 
and development.
And that's what so challenging about September 11: 
That Western chronology doesn't work anymore. The standard 
Western imperialist move, adapted from evolutionist anthro­
pology, is to understand difference as distance: geographical 
difference is mapped as temporal distance. As Johannes Fabian 
has seen, to make sense out of "the distribution of humanity in 
space," the world gets graphed on a time-line. This has 
produced "modern" Americans and "medieval" Afghans: we 
have progressed, they have not. According to this consoling 
view, they are us at an earlier point of evolution. But the 
massively effective incursion of Osama bin Laden's "primitive" 
network into American modernity and its effective use of 
"medieval" Afghanistan as his host, should make us reconsider 
our reliance on linear notions of a "historical progression of
mankind," as Walter Benjamin put it.
The other day a friend mentioned that his sense of time 
has been weirdly upset in the past three weeks. No doubt this 
is part of the profound psychic disorientation resulting from 
the trauma of September 11. It draws, in fact, on a basic 
geopolitical reality: our clock is not the world's. The way many 
Americans have up until now felt time moving forward in the 
world has been fundamentally altered. Thus calling Afghans 
"medieval," or bin Laden "primitive," becomes a defensive 
strategy: It chronologizes them as part of our evolutionary 
world and asserts our superiority again. In this way it is like 
calling the terrorists "cowards": as Paul Chevigny of NYU's Law 
School has pointed out, that is a crucial propaganda step for 
the US government. But it can't hide the fact that time is 
not—and never was — our own.
[See Kathleen Davis, "Time Behind the Veil: The Media, the 
Middle Ages, and Orientalism Now," in Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, 
editor. The Postcolonial Middle Ages (New York: Saint Martin's, 
2000), 105-22, for fuller discussion of these issues.]
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family. The narrative of white heteronormativity leaves no 
public space, no public speech, for those liminal groups—gays 
and lesbians and undocumented migrant workers, for 
instance—^who perished in the tragedies but whose degraded 
social status, hard to affirm in life, become impossible to 
acknowledge in death.
The national plaint of threatened but cherished ideals 
under terrorist attack ultimately illustrates that the nation-state 
itself can assume a melancholic form. Let us remember here 
Freud's observation that the "most remarkable characteristic of 
melancholia, and the one in most need of explanation, is its 
tendency to change round into mania—a state which is the 
opposite of it in its symptoms." In this externalized mania of 
nationalism, the value of silence goes unheard, for silence 
exists in that moment before loss gains its symbolic meaning 
and tragedy is exploited for a politics of mourning. In the 
current language of nationalism as mourning, the 
inconsolable, singular personal losses of September 11 are 
redoubled in their public display. The past—victimized, 
buried, and dead again—^is silenced once more.
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